A Fuller Picture of Organ Markets image

The American Journal of Bioethics, September 17, 2014
I. Glenn Cohen (Faculty Director)


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From the article: 

[...] A different problem with the reliance on the Iranian data is that Iran is, to put it mildly, quite different from many other countries. It is not a true organ market, but a half-market where sale is permitted but not buying and the government is the monopsonistic buyer of organs, distributing on the back end through its own system, with an overlay of gift-giving that may in fact partially reintroduce the other half of the market in it (Cohen 2013; 2014). It is one model, but there are many other kinds of regulatory configurations, and I have recently (Cohen in press) undertaken to spell out the various potential options by category (though my list is not exhaustive): price controls (set price, price floor, price ceilings), restrictions on the forms compensation can take (limits to in-kind compensation, giving organ donors and their family priority for organs), restricting who can buy and sell organs (outlawing brokerages, monopsonistic government buyer while outlawing private sale, excluding poor sellers, requiring psychological or medical screening, legal prescreening for competence and understanding of terms), restricting what kinds of organs that can be sold (permitting the sale of only cadaveric organs, permitting the sale of only certain kinds of organs such as renewable ones), and other measures (prohibit advertising, forbid judicial enforcement of contracts, permit damages but not specific performance, make contracts voidable but not void). [...]

bioethics biotechnology human subjects research i. glenn cohen international regulation